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Abstract The dominant view among macroeconomists is that macroeconomics
reduces to microeconomics, both in the sense that all macroeconomic phenomena
arise out of microeconomic phenomena and in the sense that macroeconomic the-
ory—to the extent that it is correct—can be derived from microeconomic theory.
More than that, the dominant view believes that macroeconomics should in practice
use the reduced microeconomic theory: this is the program of microfoundations for
macroeconomics to which the vast majority of macroeconomists adhere. The
‘‘microfoundational’’ models that they actually employ are, however, characterized
by another feature: they are highly idealized, even when they are applied as direct
characterizations of actual data, which itself consists of macroeconomic aggregates.
This paper explores the interrelationship between reductionism and idealization in
the microfoundational program and the role of idealization in empirical modeling.
1 Microfoundations
Economics, since the publication of John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory of
Employment, Interest, and Money in 1936, has been self-consciously divided into
two main branches: microeconomics and macroeconomics. The question of the
relationship between the two branches was raised immediately—by Keynes himself,
by his critics and by his acolytes (e.g., Keynes 1936, chs. 11 and 13; Leontief 1936;
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Klein 1947). Nonetheless, until the early 1970s, a degree of autonomy was widely
accepted for each of the two branches. With the rise of the new classical
macroeconomics in the mid-1970s, a more radical position began to dominate
economics: macroeconomic analysis could be regarded as well-grounded, secure, or
reliable only to the extent that it could be appropriately connected to microeconomic
analysis (Hoover 1988). Macroeconomics is widely regarded today as standing in
need of microfoundations and, indeed, as not being a coequal branch of economics,
rather as a derivative and, perhaps, even dispensable mode of economic analysis.
The necessity—indeed, even the possibility of microfoundations—has been
challenged in a number of different ways.1 Here, I examine one approach to
microfoundations that aims to fend off these challenges—namely, the construction
of the representative-agent model, the most popular approach to microfoundations,
as an idealization of a complete general-equilibrium model of the economy.
Microeconomics is the economics of the behavior of individual economic agents.
Typically, microeconomic models or explanations derive the behavior of an
economic agent (typically a person, household, or firm) through the optimization of
an objective function subject to constraints. An agent is modeled as a set of ordered
preferences over combinations of consumption goods (where ‘‘goods’’ is interpreted
broadly and might, for example, include items not typically traded such as leisure,
risk, or prestige). Available combinations of goods are restricted by a budget.
Behavior is modeled as the choice of the most preferred attainable combination of
goods. Similarly, a firm is typically modeled as maximizing profits subject to the
constraints of the available technology.
Microeconomic analysis that treats individuals as optimizing within a wider
context that is fixed, so that there is no feedback from the choice of the individual to
the economy as a whole, is called partial equilibrium Partial equilibrium is
frequently justified on the assumption that the individual is small relative to the
whole, so that feedbacks are negligible. Microeconomics that considers the
complete set of interactions that makes up an economy is called general
equilibrium. It is still a type of microeconomics, even though there is a sense in
which it treats the economy as a whole, since the individual agent remains the driver
and there is no place for aggregates.
Macroeconomics addresses the economy as a whole, focusing on the behavior of
economic of aggregates, such as gross domestic product (GDP), employment,
unemployment, inflation, and interest rates.
At least three distinct theses—with different methodological implications—
march under the microfoundational banner:
Thesis 1 Individuals lie behind aggregates in the sense that without individuals
there would be no aggregates.
Such a weak ontological claim is uncontroversial.
Thesis 2 How individuals behave affects or conditions how aggregates behave.
1 See, for example, Kirman (1992), Janssen (1993), Hartley (1997), Hoover (1995, 2001a, ch. 3, 2001b,
ch. 5, forthcoming).
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So, it is worth examining individual behavior for insight into aggregate behavior.
Such insight is typically treated as suggestive and qualitative, rather than restrictive
and quantifiable. Keynes himself appeared to subscribe to Thesis 2.
Thesis 3 Aggregates are nothing else but summary statistics reflecting individual
behavior.
When the microeconomic properties are taken into proper account, there simply
are no residual ontologically distinct or explanatorily efficacious macroeconomic
properties.
The standards that microfoundations have to meet in order to be successful,
clearly depend on which theses one wishes to defend. Thesis 3 is the dominant view
in economics today.2 Sometimes it is regarded aspirationally: good macroeconomics
should strive for microfoundations in this sense, even though it might not be
possible to obtain them at present, so that pragmatically we might temporarily have
to do with something less satisfactory (see Blanchard and Fischer 1989, ch. 2 and,
surprisingly, Lucas 2004). Frequently, Thesis 3 is held aggressively. Some
reductions aim to explain the success of one theory or one level of explanation
by means of a more fundamental theory but not to eliminate the reduced theory from
the practitioner’s toolkit. For example, those who believe that the ideal gas laws
reduce to statistical mechanics do not claim that the ideal gas laws should be
abandoned for practical purposes. In contrast, many advocates of Thesis 3 hold that
the only acceptable or useful macroeconomics is microfoundational.3 The
aggressive version of Thesis 3 seeks the ultimate euthanasia of macroeconomics:
there is no higher level macroeconomic theory worth preserving for a lower level
microecononomic theory to explain.
The appeal of Thesis 3 is partly the result of the conception that most economists
hold of what the discipline of economics is. The most popular definition of
economics, due to Lionel Robbins (1935, p. 16), sees economics as ‘‘the science
which studies human behavior as a relationship between scarce means which have
alternative uses.’’ Such a definition comes close to saying, ‘‘if it is not
microeconomics, it is not economics.’’
More salient perhaps is Robert Lucas et al. (1976) famous ‘‘critique’’ of
econometric policy evaluation. Lucas argued that macroeconometric models—that
is, statistically estimated models of the relationships among macroeconomic
aggregates—were not identified in the sense that, though they captured correlations
among the data, they did not capture the causal structure that generates them.
Failure of identification renders such models useless for conditional prediction and,
therefore, for policy analysis. Lucas argued that policymakers adopt rules. To the
2 Although it would be an unnecessary detour to lay out the evidence, there is no hyperbole is involved in
this claim. Robert Lucas (1987, pp. 107–108), the dominant figure in macroeconomics since 1970,
expresses the hope that ‘‘the term ‘macroeconomic’ will simply disappear from use and the the modifer
‘micro’ will become superfluous.’’ See the further discussions of Hoover (1988) and Hartley (1997), who
are both skeptical of the wisdom of the microfoundational program, and in Chari and Kehoe (2006), who
welcome the program. All agree on its dominance.




degree that individuals understand these rules, they incorporate them into their own
choices. If the rules change, the choices change, and the implied relationships
among variables that aggregate those choices also change.
At one level the Lucas critique is a general claim that is hardly original to Lucas:
conditional inference requires an appropriately causally articulated model (see, for
example, Marschak 1953). Lucas’s distinctive contribution—and the one that ties
the Lucas critique to microfoundations—is the claim that, in economics, the only
acceptable causal articulation must capture the intentional actions of economic
agents. The fundamental explanatory trope of microeconomics is that ought implies
is. Economics on this view is intentional; it must capture the beliefs, expectations,
and choices of individual agents. Macroecononomics without microfoundations will
fail to do so.
The majority of macroeconomists accept some sort of microfoundational thesis.
Radical advocates of Thesis 3 require an implementable reduction of macroeco-
nomics to microeconomics adequate to the Lucas critique. To be successful, such a
reduction would have to offer a causal articulation of aggregate data that appeals
only to microeconomic theory. All parties acknowledge that no account that has to
model the decision problem of each and every agent in the economy is feasible.
Standard microfoundational approaches are defended as offering—implicitly or
explicitly—an idealization of the necessary reduction, which is argued to be
successful because the idealization is a good one. My central question is whether
such idealized reductions as they are actually used in macroeconomics successful.
2 Implementing Reduction
The most popular way of implementing the reduction of macroeconomics to
microeconomics is the representative-agent strategy: a single agent or limited
number of agents (typical of types or categories of agents), who follow
microeconomic rules, stands for the whole economy.4
The most straightforward difficulty with representative-agent models is that they
typically adopt functional forms for the preferences of the representative agent that
directly mimic the forms that microeconomists have found most useful in describing
the behavior of individuals. Yet, it is well known that perfect aggregation—the
situation in which aggregates behave as scaled up versions of microeconomic
quantities—is possible only under conditions that are certainly never realized
(Gorman 1953, Hoover 2001a, ch. 3). Perfect aggregation requires homothetic and
identical preferences. Identical: you and Bill Gates have the same preferences.
Homothetic: Bill Gates, the billionaire, must spend the same proportion of his
income on, say, chocolate as would an impoverished Bill Gates. Without perfect
aggregation, there is no fixed relationship between the functional forms that might
govern aggregates and those that describe the behavior of individuals. These are
4 Alternative approaches such as that of Aoki and Yoshikawa (2007), who draw on the resources of
statistical physics, may hold considerable promise but stand outside the mainstream of contemporary
macroeconomics and, indeed, are unknown to most macroeconomists.
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technical points and are not controversial among economic theorists (see Kirman
1992 and the references therein).
Given the impossibility of perfect aggregation, what then is the appeal of the
representative-agent model? Modern macroeconomists frequently cite Frank Ram-
sey’s (1928) formulation of the optimal savings problem in which an economy-wide
utility function is maximized subject to a production constraint. Whether Ramsey
believed that the utility function belonged to a social planner (a Hobbesian
Leviathan) or was somehow the aggregation of individual utility functions is unclear
(see Duarte 2007). Ramsey’s analysis is known today as a social-planner problem.
As such it neither raises the issue of microfoundations nor implements a reduction of
microeconomics to macroeconomics. But an argument that is meant to justify it as a
microfoundational construction draws on a general equilibrium analysis.
The so-called ‘‘second theorem of welfare economics’’ states that every Pareto
optimal distribution can be supported as a competitive equilibrium for some
distribution of initial endowments.5 The social-planner problem is then seen as a
computationally convenient way of summarizing what is in effect a decentralized
general equilibrium model—that is, a microeconomic model.
There are a number of problems with this strategy as an adequate reduction of
macroeconomics to microeconomics. First, if we take the aggregate utility function
seriously as belonging to the social planner, decentralization of the planner’s
program would then require actual redistribution of endowments. In other words,
the model is one of a command economy—even if one administered through market
transactions—and there is little reason to think that it captures the sort of market
economies that are the objects of modeling.
Second, an alternative interpretation assumes that the representative-agent’s
utility function really does approximate the average preferences of individuals. This
amounts to aggregation of preferences, and, once again, perfect aggregation is not
possible. Kenneth Arrow’s (1951) famous impossibility theory demonstrated that
preferences cannot be aggregated in a manner consistent with weak, and intuitively
appealing, regularity conditions. The representative agent’s utility function could
not represent disparate individual preferences, as Thesis 3 requires.
In fact, third, the decentralization of the social planner problem is typically itself
carried out only in a representative manner (see, for example, Blanchard and Fischer
1989, ch. 2). Leviathan’s optimization is shown to be equivalent to an optimization
problem with aggregate prices, wages, and interest rates, as if there were markets for
GDP, aggregate labor, and aggregate money rather than markets for golf balls,
accountants, and particular withdrawals from ATM machines. Finally, to further
complicate the problem, the theorem on which the whole strategy rests requires that
the conditions of perfect competition be fulfilled. Any market imperfection renders
the second theorem of welfare economics false.
Stripped of the support of the decentralization theorem, the representative-agent
strategy amounts to the assertion that reduction has been achieved when we posit an
agent whose utility derives from various macroeconomic aggregates and who takes
5 A distribution is Pareto optimal (or efficient) if no reallocation can improve the position of any
individual without making some individual worse off.
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national income as his budget. Yet, there are no individual agents and no individual
commodities in the model. Rhetoric aside, the model mimics the mathematics of
microeconomics without employing its substance.
It is easy to lampoon the representative-agent strategy: it is analogous to
providing a reduction of the gas laws to mechanics by modeling a single molecule
scaled up to room size (Hoover 2001a, ch. 3). Nevertheless, it is related to a more
defensible strategy, which I discuss in detail in Sect. 4: idealized reduction.
Idealized reduction is more defensible in that it connects the macro to the micro
through clear idealizing steps and provides scope for improving the idealization in
the sense of progressively relaxing the idealizing assumptions. While I believe that
it does not ultimately succeed in providing eliminative microfoundations for
macroeconomics, there is a case to answer. Before investigating that case, let us
consider idealization more generally.
3 Formal and Substantive Idealization
3.1 Formal Idealization
One account of idealization in science is found, for example, in the work of Leszek
Nowak (1980).6 Nowak’s idea is that a theory is a formal structure and that a
complete theory is idealized when elements of that structure are set to limiting
values so that that they cease to contribute to the explanatory machinery of the
theory. For example, we might have a complete theory of planetary motion
governed by Newton’s laws. An idealized theory might then set the values of
planetary diameters to zero; while, nonetheless, retaining the measured value of
their masses. Such idealizations are frequently used in actual calculations. The
essential insight is that some features of a theory are of primary importance in
achieving its explanatory goals, and others are secondary. There are degrees of
idealization, depending on how many secondary factors have been set aside. The
explanatory range, the detail, and the accuracy of a theory can be improved, albeit at
a cost in terms of tractability, through a process of progressive concretization—that
is through reinstating the secondary factors one by one, bringing the idealized ever
closer to a full description of reality.
Idealization for Nowak is related to the structure of theoretical explanation. Since
we will examine the structure of microfoundational explanation in some detail in the
next section, it is helpful to understand Nowak’s formal account. Let x be the target
of explanation, G(x) be a complete theory, and F(x) and idealized theory; and let Hi,
i = 1, 2, …, n, denote primary factors and pj, j = 1, 2, …, k, denote secondary
factors. A complete theory is idealized by setting secondary factors to their limits
(0 or ?, but represented without loss of generality as pj = 0). Thus, the relationship
between the idealization and the complete theory is given by,
6 For a critical discussion of Nowak’s account of idealization, see Hoover 1994.
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if GðxÞ and p1ðxÞ ¼ 0 and p2ðxÞ ¼ 0 and . . . pk1ðxÞ ¼ 0 and pkðxÞ
¼ 0; then FðxÞ ¼ f ðH1ðxÞ; H2ðxÞ; . . .; HnðxÞÞ: ð1Þ
In the previous example, G(x) would represent the complete theory of planetary
motion governed by Newton’s laws, one of the pj(x) = 0 might state that the
diameters of the planets are zero, and their masses would be among the factors
indicated by the Hi(x). Each concretizing step amounts to removing one of the
statements setting a secondary factor to a limiting value (pz(x) = 0) and adding a
related primary factor (Hz(x)) to the idealized theory. Naturally, the more idealized
theory is structured differently than the less idealized theory, so that F0(x) replaces
F(x). The relationship between the complete theory and the still idealized, but now
more concrete theory is given by:
if GðxÞ and p1ðxÞ ¼ 0 and p2ðxÞ ¼ 0 and . . . pz1ðxÞ
¼ 0 and pzðxÞ 6¼ 0 and pzþ1ðxÞ
¼ 0. . . and pkðxÞ ¼ 0; then F0 xð Þ
¼ f 0ðH1ðxÞ; H2ðxÞ; . . . HzðxÞ. . .; HnðxÞÞ:
ð2Þ
When each of the idealizing assumptions have been removed in this way, the
idealized theory is fully concretized, and the complete theory is recovered.
If such a formal idealization is to do any work in science, the distinction between
primary and secondary factors needs to be fleshed out. It must be a substantive and
not merely formal distinction. Otherwise, the exercise is easily trivialized. Formally,
we can always simply redesignate any primary factor (Hj) as a secondary factors (pi)
or vice versa. We can then set aside the new secondary factor by setting it to a
limiting value; and we can always recover the full theory through successive
concretization. That we can always do this formally, however, gives no guarantee
that the ‘‘idealized’’ theory can in any sense do the work of the full theory, which is
essential if the idealization is to have any point.
What does it mean ‘‘to do the work’’ of the full theory? To take an example,
computations using the idealized theory of planetary motion are able to predict to
some desired level of approximation the observed orbital paths even if, because of
idealization, they have nothing whatever to say about tides or wobbles of the
planetary axes. The distinction between primary and secondary factors must clearly
be understood relative to the desired target of explanation (e.g., that we care about
the orbits and not the wobbles). Without an adequate substantive distinction, any set
of propositions that could be written in the nested structure of (1) would count as an
idealization, even if it lacked all explanatory power. There is a sense in which the
idealization must, to use Plato’s metaphor, take the world apart a the joints. The
idealization must get to the essence of the matter. One advantage of the formal
analysis is that it suggests that there may be more than one way to idealize, more
than one essence of the matter (a point made specifically by Franklin-Hall 2008 and
in other contexts by Teller 2001 and Woodward 2003, ch. 5).
Formal accounts of idealization imply that the complete theory (G(x)) is known,
so that idealization is a matter of the setting aside of known secondary factors. Such
a conception is impractical: frequently, we do not know—except perhaps in a broad
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brush way—exactly what we are idealizing away. In practice, idealization is less a
matter of subtracting away considerations from a complete theory than of building
up a simplified model.
The terms ‘‘theory’’ and ‘‘model’’ are fraught (see for example, Hausman’s 1992,
ch. 5, discussion in relation to economics). Without trying to resolve the issue of
how best to use these terms, I have so far adopted what I believe to be the vernacular
among economists. ‘‘Theories’’ in this usage are more abstract; ‘‘models’’ are
concrete and instantiate general theoretical lessons in particular forms for particular
pragmatic purposes. Models are tools for reasoning. Most models provide practical
algorithms for deriving concrete conclusions or rules for manipulation and
heuristics for drawing analogies between the model and modeled phenomena.
On this view, models are not idealizations, though they may in some sense
participate in idealizations. For some purposes an ideal triangle is a polygon with
three straight sides setting aside any reference to its particular angles or the lengths
of its sides. Such an idealized triangle may figure in geometric proofs. But a model
of a triangle (for example, a diagram or a manipulable object) cannot be ideal in the
same way. It will be imperfect; its sides for example, not being straight except
within some limits of approximation. And it will be particular: it must have definite
angles and lengths of sides. Such a model functions as an idealization only under
some self-denying ordinances or interpretive protocols that eschew conclusions that
depend on the particular, non-ideal features.
3.2 Substantive Idealization
The relationship between the model triangle and the ideal triangle suggests another
form of idealization that we might call substantive idealization. Galilean idealiza-
tions are substantive in that they amount to isolating causal mechanisms from
disturbing casual influences to exhibit their operation in a pure form (McMullin
1985; Cartwright 1989, ch. 5). Sometimes such isolations are understood
theoretically so that they are closely analogous to the formal idealizing steps of
Nowak’s formulation (1). But sometimes we know only phenomenal, not
theoretical, relationships, which are used instrumentally to eliminate causal
disturbances. Other times we appeal to general strategies of isolation such as
shielding or randomization that we believe will eliminate a range of non-specific
disturbances. At all times, we simply hope that our substantive idealizations have
not left out any important, but unknown, disturbing factor.
While formal idealization is a matter of theoretical structure, the promise of
substantive idealizations is that they might be quantified and engaged with concrete
situations (e.g., experiments) or models. Substantive idealization is correlative to
approximation. A substantively idealized model is successful if it fits the data or
predicts, or meets some other measure of differential empirical success, well enough
within some acceptable limits of approximation, provided that its success is
traceable to—that is, depends essentially on—the model. The idealization of the
distance of fall of a dense sphere according to Newton’s laws as dis-
tance =  9 g 9 time2 is successful if, up to the limits of approximation we care
about, it fits the data as well as a less idealized relationship that, say, took account of
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air resistance and if the successful fit would not have been achieved through an
alternative characterization, say, a linear one such as distance =  9 g 9 time.
The notion of dependency is fuzzy, since there are variations in the relationship
that will be indistinguishable within any particular limits of approximation. Yet,
such a distinction is needed with respect to substantive idealization for the same
reason that a substantive distinction between primary and secondary factors was
needed in Nowak’s account of formal idealization.
4 The Idealized Reduction of Macroeconomics to Microeconomics
Standard graduate textbooks in macroeconomics are not usually methodologically
self-conscious. They may nonetheless provide an implicit argument in support of
microfoundations. A well known graduate textbook, Blanchard and Fischer’s
Lectures on Macroeconomics (1989, ch. 2), opens with a representative-agent model
of economic growth. We have already seen that, without further defense, such a
model provides an unattractive account of microfoundations. Yet, in later chapters,
Blanchard and Fisher provide alternative models, ostensibly grounded in individual
agents. To the extent that such models are successful and do not contradict the
conclusions of representative-agent models, they constitute both successful
microfoundations and a defense of the representative-agent model. Since these
models, do not in fact characterize each and every agent in an economy, they are
best understood as employing a strategy of idealization. We now examine the nature
of those idealizations, arguing that they are ultimately unsuccessful, so that they do
not provide—and a fortiori representative-agent models do not provide—workable
microfoundations for macroeconomics.
4.1 The Fundamental Idealization of Economics
Economics is itself founded on an idealization sometimes referred to as ‘‘rational
economic man.’’ The essence of the idealization is that economic actions are viewed
as optimal choices under binding constraints. Karl Popper (1976) generalized the
economists’ idealization under the title ‘‘situational logic’’ or ‘‘situational analysis’’
to be the method of the social sciences: characterize a situation and a goal, and then
predict what people will do as the best means of achieving the goal in that situation
(Koertge 1979). Popper was fully aware that this was an idealization in the sense
that actual agents deviated from the analysis frequently.
Historically, rational economic man was regarded not as a true description, but as
an idealization. Mill, Jevons, and Marshall all recognized a hierarchy of human
motives or values, of which they saw the economic as being the lowest, but also the
broadest and most pervasive. While they did not use the terminology of idealization,
they nevertheless saw constrained-optimization as a substantive idealization. It
captured a real tendency in human behavior, which dominated but did not
completely determine, certain individual and social outcomes. Reasoning based on
such a pervasive motive was, therefore, a good enough approximation for many
purposes and many circumstances.
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The fundamental idealization has come to define modern economics (see
Robbins’s (1935) definition cited in Sect. 1). On the one hand, because it is an
idealization, this definition limits the claims for precision in economic explana-
tion. On the other hand, because it defines the field, any microfoundational
strategy must in some sense be compatible with it. A major appeal of
representative-agent and other similar microfoundational models is that they
explicitly respect this constraint.
4.2 Microeconomics Idealizations
The centrality of the constrained-optimization idealization explains the persistent
urge to discover the microfoundations of macroeconomics. Blanchard and Fischer
(1989, ch. 8) provides a nice exemplar of a microfoundational reduction of
macroeconomics. In the interest of pedagogical clarity, their account is schematic,
omitting many details that may be repaired in obvious ways.
Blanchard and Fischer’s reduction also calls on idealizations of a higher order—
that is, ones that apply within microeconomics qua microeconomics and are not
particular to the reduction of macroeconomics to microeconomics. The primary
example of such an idealization is the form of competition, which is treated in
nearly every microeconomics textbook. Consider the sole producer of a good (a
monopolist). The monopolist faces the entire market demand and to maximize
profits chooses a price or a quantity to produce (one implies the other as a function
of demand) that balances the increase in net revenue per unit as prices rise against
the fall in the number of units sold. If we consider two or more producers (duopoly
or oligopoly) of the same type of good, we introduce the problem of their
interaction—the optimal behavior of each depends on the choices of the others. To
reach any definitive conclusion, some assumption about how producers behave in
oligopolistic situations is introduced.
The most common assumption derives from Cournot (1838[1929]): each
producer takes the other producers’ quantity decisions as fixed and unaffected by
its own choice; it then chooses the quantity that maximizes profits. An equilibrium
occurs when each firms’ best response is to maintain its current response and every
firm charges the same price. Each firm’s optimization problem can be described as a
reaction function of their quantities to a common market price.
Cournot’s assumption or other alternatives should not be regarded as idealiza-
tions in Nowak’s sense. Rather they are particular, non-ideal features similar to the
particular angles that must be incorporated into a manipulable model triangle. Once
in place, however, they may help sustain idealization. Take the Cournot oligopoly
solution as a starting point and let the number of identical producers of identical
goods (n) rise without limit (n ? ?). Producers are then seen as infinite in number
and infinitely small relative to the market. Unlike the monopolist at the n = 1
extreme, their quantity decisions do not individually affect price, so they simply
take prices as given by the market and give their best quantity response. This is
clearly a Nowakian idealization in which market power (the ability to affect the
demand for one’s own product) is idealized away by taking the number or firms to
an extreme limit. Market prices themselves ‘‘emerge’’ from the interaction of these
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highly disaggregated producers’ reaction functions, which aggregate to market
supply, and the similarly highly disaggregated consumers’ reaction functions, which
aggregate to market demand.
Monopolistic competition differs from perfect competition in that goods are
seen as multidimensional, so that they may have features in common with other
goods and yet have other features that make them distinct. Different brands of
beer, for instance, are similar and, in that respect, compete with other brands; yet
Heineken is unique in its particular formulation, and the Heineken company is the
sole purveyor (monopolist) of the brand. Monopolistic competition is the analogue
of perfect competition when goods have this multidimensional form: each
producer is a monopolist of its own particular good, which nevertheless competes
with other related goods. Under perfect competition, any price above the market
price would result in no sales; while any price below the market price would
capture all market demand (albeit selling at a loss). In contrast, under
monopolistic competition, consumers may not go for the cheapest good: it may
be worth paying more for a Heineken than a Miller Lite—the two brands are
imperfect substitutes. Indeed, a consumer may diversify consumption according to
the interaction of strength of relative preference and price. So, like a monopolist,
the producer must set its price to balance the gains of higher prices to unit
revenue against the losses of reduced demand. The assumption of price-taking is
given up in favor of price-setting, even though the producer remains small relative
to the market.
Monopolistic competition can be seen as a less idealized model than perfect
competition. If we could give a measure of the differentia among goods, then
perfect competition would be the Nowakian limit case in which the differences
among goods approached zero.
4.3 A Reduction of Macroeconomics to Microeconomics
We now turn to the roles perfect competition and monopolistic competition, among
other idealizations, in the reductions of macroeconomics to microeconomics.
Blanchard and Fischer’s (1989, ch. 8) model assumes monopolistic competition,
but a parallel development could easily be provided for a model using perfect
competition.
The first step in their reduction is the idealization that goods are identical in
production technology, yet are multidimensional in a way that makes them
imperfect substitutes. For example, every type of beer might use the same brewing
technology and have the same unit costs of production, even though their recipes
differed so that each appealed to some customers more than others. The
identicalness of goods on the dimension relevant to production can be seen as a
Nowakian idealization, like the analogous assumption of identical firms in the
microeconomic model of perfect competition.
Many of the key issues of macroeconomics are captured in the next step.












where i = 1, 2,…, n indexes individual consumer/producers; Mi = money holdings
by the ith consumer/producer; Yi = output of good i produced by the ith consumer/
producer; Ci = ‘‘consumption’’ and is defined by a function that aggregates the









where Cij = the consumption of good j by agent i; and P is the general price level,








The functional forms of the model are governed by the parameters d, g, b, and h.
The particular functional forms of Eqs. (3) and (4) are familiar to economists: (3)
is a Cobb-Douglas utility function with an additional linearly separable term in Yi;
(4) is a constant-elasticity of substitution aggregator function. These forms are
chosen not as Nowakian idealizations of some actual preference function but as
tractable forms with well-known mathematical properties, some of which may be
adjusted to approximate features of actual preferences. They are then stipulated,
non-ideal characteristics (particular concretizations) of the model. As such, they
function like concrete models of triangles (see Sect. 3.1) from which conclusions
can be drawn either when they are substantively accurate (to some level of
approximation) reflections of the relevant actual features of the world or when we
do not rely on their particular arbitrary properties (i.e., when conclusions are robust
to alternative functional forms).
Other features amount to similar particular concretizations.
• setting the number of producers, goods produced, and consumers to the same
number (n);
• putting money holdings in the utility function without any attempt to model the
manner in which money facilitates trade (although dividing money by a general
price level (P) is meant to capture the characteristic feature of money that its
effective (or real) quantity depends on what it will buy);
• treating the costs of production as expressible only as a disutility associated with
the level of production of the consumer/producer’s single produced good, rather
than directly connecting production to labor or other inputs to production.
Each of these assumptions may be regarded as a pedagogical trick, which helps to
make the model more tractable, but which in principle could be relaxed or replaced
with a more empirically relevant assumptions in straightforward ways. They do not
seem to raise special problems for the project of microfoundations.
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PjCij þ Mi ¼ PiYi þ Mi ¼ Ii; ð6Þ
where Mi = initial endowment of money for the ith agent. Equation (6) says that
income (Ii) consists of the value of what agents sell (PiYi) plus the money they
start with and that income is in turn divided between money spent on individual
goods (PjCij) and money saved (Mi). From this optimization problem, Blanchard
and Fischer are able to derive demands for each good (and for holdings of
money) for each consumer and the supply of each good for each individual
producer—each as a function of the price of goods relative to the general price
level (P).
A systemic solution can be viewed in two ways. First, as a general equilibrium,
the model can be solved for a set of prices that makes the supply and demand for
each good and for money equal, taking all agents into account. This is a
quintessentially microeconomic solution. The actual derivation rests on symmetry.
Since every good is produced using the same production technology and each enters
into the individual’s utility functions with the same weight and all individuals are
identical, each should have the same price in equilibrium. Equation (5) then
guarantees that the price of each individual good and the general price level are
identical, so that all relative prices are unity.
A second way to view the solution calculates various aggregates. Nominal
aggregate demand for goods (Y) is by definition the sum over all goods and agents of














Making use of the forms of the individual demand functions (not shown), the
equality of aggregate demand and output, and the symmetry of prices (implying that
relative prices are unity) allows the derivation of aggregate demand functions in









M ¼ ð1  gÞðPY þ MÞ: ð9Þ
Individual price and output decisions can be derived as part of the solution to the
consumers’/producers’ optimization problems. In conjunction with the definition of











Together the macroeconomic system (8), (9) and (10) determine the principal
aggregates in the economy. The macroeconomic description has supposedly been
reduced to the microeconomic in that the macroeconomic system is derived directly
from the microeconomic general equilibrium solution to Eqs. (3), (4), (5) and (6).
Each of the macroeconomic variables is an aggregation of the microeconomic
variables, and the functional forms of the macroeconomic relations are determined
by the functional forms and parameters of the microeconomic relationships.
Since idealizing assumptions were involved in the microeconomic model, the
reduction is itself idealized. But the model is taken to be a starting point for a model
that will concretize a sufficient number of these idealizations until it will serve as a
substantive idealization—in this case a model that provides a close enough
approximation to the world that it can rationalize actual macroeconomic data.
One example of such improvability, one concretizing step, was the move from
the idealization that all the goods are identical, giving a model of perfect
competition, to one in which goods are distinct in a manner that supports
monopolistic competition. Later in the same lecture, Blanchard and Fischer further
concretize the ideal assumption of perfectly flexible prices with assumptions about
the costs of price setting that result in models in which prices adjust slowly to
shocks to the system (e.g., to a change in M, the money supply).
4.4 Does the Idealization Work?
Blanchard and Fischer’s microfoundational reduction involves a number of
idealizing steps that are consistent with the goal of achieving substantive
idealization. Whether the model is sufficiently concretized on these dimensions is
not an a priori conceptual matter, but a matter for empirical investigation and
resolution. The reduction nonetheless involves two steps that do raise conceptual
difficulties.
The first is reflected in the utility function (Eq. 3) that treats the consumption and
production decisions as the integrated choice of a single agent. The microreduction
views this step as a way of capturing the insight that coordination among agents is
essential to macroeconomics. In their formulation, part of the coordination is
guaranteed through collapsing the decisions of some firms and consumers (typically
different agents in the real economy) into a single optimization problem. While the
collapse eliminates any conflict in the choices of particular firm-consumer pairs, the
monopolistic competition model at the heart of Blanchard and Fischer’s reduction
appears to leave room for other conflicting choices by having many such pairs.
Yet there is less here than meets the eye. The model can be viewed as a
Nowakian idealization of a Walrasian general-equilibrium model in which
producers and consumers are all separate agents. Even at this disaggregated
extreme, a genuine coordination problem fails to arise. To see this, consider the
perfectly competitive, rather than the monopolistically competitive, case. Here we
can push the idealization further and collapse the individual agents into a single,
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representative agent. The coordination issue is then eliminated, since the economy is
governed by a single optimization problem. This is clearly unattractive and accounts
for our dismissing the representative-agent model in the first case. But is the
general-equilibrium extreme any better?
Consider the general-equilibrium analogue to the representative agent’s
optimization problem. Individual agents, solving individual optimization problems
provide part of the coordination. They do not, however, provide all of it. In the
idealization, the agents are price-takers, each too small to affect the market on its
own. Somehow their choices must be made mutually consistent. The explicit
mechanism is that they face a set of common prices, and those prices are adjusted
until excess supplies and demands are eliminated. The explicitly modeled agents
set quantities in response to market prices, but who sets market prices? And on
the basis of what knowledge?
Economic theorists offer two approaches to these questions. First, sometimes
they simply abstract away from the process of price setting and focus only on the
equilibrium states, asserting that they exist and that comparisons among equilibria
are the salient ones, without considering how an equilibrium is established.
Equilibrium is deus ex machina. Nonetheless, even the mathematics of discovering
equilibria in formal general-equilibrium models points to the character of the god in
the machine. The existence of an equilibrium is proved by establishing that a
general equilibrium model has a fixed point in a mapping which takes a set of prices,
considers the excess demands in the economy at those prices, and sets a new set of
prices calculated to reduce some of the excess demands. A fixed point corresponds
to the mapping not proposing any change in the prices, which can happen only when
all excess demands are zero—a situation which defines the equilibrium.7 The
mathematics demonstrates that far from economizing on information, something in
the economy must do the work of the mapping and process prices in response to all
of the excess demands.
The second approach to price setting is to give the god in the machine a name. On
the analogy with real-world auctions, that name is frequently ‘‘auctioneer.’’
Although the circumlocution is frequently ‘‘the economy behaves as if there were an
auctioneer,’’ the auctioneer is not an idealization of the exchange process of
macroeconomics, in which the possibility of inconsistent decisions is a live one.
Rather—implicitly or explicitly—it is a particular, and particularly unhelpful,
concretization, which suggests falsely that the best analogue to a decentralized
economy is a command economy in which information is processed centrally.
Once again, the case of monopolistic competition, as in Blanchard and Fischer’s
model, may seem different, since price-setting is decentralized, prices being a
choice variable for the n consumer-producers. Unfortunately, our monotheistic
coordinating god in the machine has simply assumed a polytheistic form.
The equilibrium value of the aggregate price level in Eq. (10) is derived from its
definition (Eq. 5) and the optimal (relative) price for each consumer-producer:
7 The technical details are available in standard textbooks on general-equilibrium theory such as Arrow













 b1 ! 11þhðb1Þ
: ð11Þ
Two things should be noted. First, the functional form of this individual
optimization problem depends on the parameters of the utility function (3), and may
thus seem to refer only to the individual and to represent a small volume of
information: h, d, g, and b do not seem like much to know, especially since they
correspond to data available to actual people through introspection. The simplicity
is deceptive, since it results from the assumption that all agents are identical. If that
assumption were relaxed, then the parameters of every agent would show up in the
analogue to (11). This is obvious, since the monopolistic competitor sets prices on
the basis of a demand curve for its product that depends on the demands of every
consumer and the supply responses of all of its competitors.
Second, application of Eq. (11) requires knowledge of the general price level P,
and as (5) shows P is constructed through a complex weighting of the individual
prices (Pj). In fact, Eq. (5) is a rather odd aggregating function that bears no obvious
relationship to any of the standard formulae for calculating price indices used, for
example, by national statistical bureaux. The form of (5) is, in fact, dictated by a
macroeconomic consideration: P is defined in just such as way as to make
aggregate monetary expenditures on goods equals aggregate monetary incomes
ðPi PCi ¼PiPj PjCjiÞ, a condition required by national-income-accounting
conventions.8 The general price level is, thus, an irreducible macroeconomic
quantity, which cannot be eliminated from the reduction in the sense that individual
agents must refer to an aggregate—to the whole—in order to make their individual
choices. In fact, its units are not analogous to the units of any individual price. I
have previously argued that the general price level is an emergent property of
macroeconomic systems and ontologically distinct from, while nonetheless
supervenient on, the prices of individual goods (Hoover 1995, 2001b, ch. 5).
The implicit assumption, then, is that far from succeeding in decentralizing the
processing of knowledge and price setting, the microfoundational reduction based
on monopolistic competition has put each consumer-firm in a position analogous to
the auctioneer, who must know everyone’s business. Any objection to the
auctioneer in the setting of perfect competition must be multiplied by n in
the setting of monopolistic competition. Rather than isolating the essence of the
coordination problem, the microreduction dissolves it with a particular assumption
that amounts to assuming it away. The situation is much the same as if we offered a
figure as an idealized triangle, but neglected to give it three sides.
The second conceptual difficulty of the microreduction concerns aggregation.
Again, it helps to start with perfect competition. The assumption that agents are price
takers and small relative to the market is a properly formulated Nowakian formal
idealization and may, in practice, prove to be a useful substantive idealization. In
contrast, the argument that justifies the representative-agent assumption through an
8 See Nelson (1984) for a discussion of microreductions that are constrained by macroeconomic
relationships.
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idealization in which general equilibrium stands at one limit and the representative-
agent at the other introduces an improper idealization. The representative agent is
held to follow the rule of perfect competition, price-taking, which is justified on the
idealizing assumptions that n ? ?; yet the representative agent is itself an
idealization in which n ? 1. The representative agent is—inconsistently—simul-
taneously the whole market and small relative to market. The problem can be
summed up by the question: with whom does the representative agent trade?
Another aspect of the problem can be seen by noting that the acceptable
idealization of perfect competition in microeconomics applies to markets for
particular goods, while macroeconomics must somehow capture the economy as a
whole. This, as we have seen before, suggests that the idealization should start with
a general equilibrium system in which there are many different goods. The model
would then involve two idealizations. The first lets the number of distinct goods
approach a limit at one. The second lets the diversity of types of agents approach a
single type, while letting there still be n agents. Aggregation might then appear
simple. Aggregate demand would equal n 9 individual demand, and aggregate
supply would equal n 9 individual supply. The aggregation would be justified if it
yielded a good enough approximation for the purposes at hand. Economics
textbooks not infrequently speak of such modeling assumptions—often referring to
the single good as some ubiquitous commodity—e.g., ‘‘corn’’ or ‘‘steel.’’
As we have already noted in Sect. 2, aggregation theory tell us that adding up of
individual demands or supplies to a well behaved aggregate demand or supply
requires the strong assumption of homotheticity as well as identical goods and
agents. Otherwise, as prices, and consequently incomes, change, the aggregates
themselves would change and the representative agent’s optimization problem and
resulting demand and supply functions would no longer take the same form (just
scaled up) as a particular agent’s optimization problem and resulting functions. The
requirement of homotheticity is not a Nowakian idealization. It does not eliminate a
substantive factor as inessential by setting it to a limit. Instead, it is a particular
concrete assumption upon which the result critically depends. And it is not robust or
an attractive prospect for a useful approximation.
Once again, the move toward monopolistic competition does not resolve the
problem. Blanchard and Fischer assume identical agents and posit homothetic utility
functions. Although they do not assume that goods are identical, the goods are
identical in the only ways that matter for aggregation. So, like our previous example
of different types of beer, their goods are identical in production requirements, and
they enter perfectly symmetrically into utility functions. These strong assumptions
trivialize the variety of goods in the real-world, but create the precise conditions
needed for aggregation. With perfect competition, we derived the representative
agent through an improper idealization. We could rationalize the representative
agent through a microreduction that made stronger, particular and nonidealizing
assumptions. And even though, Blanchard and Fischer, in this particular model, do
not posit a representative agent, we find that they make essentially the same strong,
particular, and nonidealizing assumptions in order to provide a microfoundation for




5 Microfoundations—A Less Than Ideal Reduction
The idea that macroeconomics not only needs microfoundations, but that
microeconomics can replace macroeconomics completely is the dominant position
in modern economics. No one, however, knows how to derive empirically relevant
explanations of observable aggregate relations from the precise individual behaviors
that generate them. Instead, the claims to have produced microfoundations are
typically fleshed out with representative-agent models in which a single agent treats
the aggregates as objects of direct choice, playing by rules that appear to follow the
logic and mathematics of microeconomics. It is easy to mock the representative
agent. But the defense that is sometimes offered is to provide models that employ a
number of idealizing assumptions and appear to either deliver a representative-agent
model or an account of unproblematic aggregation.
I accept idealization as a strategy of model building. But scientifically useful
idealization requires that the idealized model capture the essence of the causal
structure or underlying mechanisms at work. It is only on that basis that we can trust
the model to analyze situations other than the data to hand. And that rationale is
precisely what is behind the call for microfoundations in the first place. Models are
not, of their nature, cleanly idealized; they must involve particular properties, whose
only function is to make them operable or realizable in a manipulable form. Arbitrary
concretizations are unavoidable. A model with utility maximizing agents, must give
the utility functions a form. Yet, the trick of using models appropriately is that we
should either be able to set aside these particularities in reasoning or show that the
results of interest are robust to the range of particular forms that we might reasonably
assume. To return to a previous example: a model of a triangle includes particular
angles; yet any conclusions that we derive from our model about triangles in general
or about some particular triangles in the world which we have no reason to believe
are congruent to our model cannot depend critically on those particular angles.
The essence of my criticism of the common strategies of reducing microeco-
nomics to macroeconomics is that it is based in model building that mixes legitimate
idealizations with non-ideal, particular modeling assumptions and then relies on
those assumptions at critical junctures in providing the derivation of the
macroeconomic relationships from microeconomic behaviors.
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